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Facing China: Taiwan's Status as a Separate




A defining date in Taiwan's diplomatic and economic history was 11 November
2001. In Doha, Qatar, the Fourth Ministerial Conference of the World Trade
Organization (WTO) unanimously approved Taiwan's application for WTO
membership, just 24 hours after approving China's admission.1 After Taiwan's
Congress ratified the country's entry protocol and the government deposited relevant
agreements in the Secretariat in Geneva,2 Taiwan became the 144th WTO Member as
the ``Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu'', abbreviated
as ``Chinese Taipei'', on 1 January 2002.3
Taiwan's choice of this tedious title in the WTO, instead of its official name,
Republic of China (ROC), shows its reluctant compromise with political reality.
Taiwan's trade volume places it among the top 10 percent of that of all WTO
Members. Nonetheless, it took Taiwan 12 years of strenuous efforts to enter this
``United Nations of Economics and Trade'' since submitting its accession application in
1990.4 In fact, most of Taiwan's agreements were completed by late 1999, but because
of China's insistence that Taiwan can only accede to the WTO after its entry and
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1 Mark O'Neill, China Signs WTO Agreement; US President Welcomes Accession of Mainland and Taiwan as
Engine for Global Economic Growth, South China Morning Post, Hong Kong, 12 November 2001, p. A1; Chi Chin-
ling and Maubo Chang, Taiwan Inks WTO Entry paper, Central News Agency (Taiwan), 13 November 2001,
available at Lexis, News Library, Allasi File; Sofia Wu, WTO Entry Marks New Milestone in ROC's Return to World
Stage, Central News Agency (Taiwan), 12 November 2001, available at Lexis, News Library, Allasi File.
2 For discussions on the procedure of accession to the WTO, see John H. Jackson, W.J. Davey and A.O.
Sykes Jr (eds), Legal Problems of International Economic Problems, Cases, Materials, and Text (4th edn, St Paul, MN:
West Group, 2002), pp. 233±234.
3 See ibid., p. 1227 (``China announced that it would immediately deposit its formal acceptance of the WTO
Agreement. As such, Chinese membership became effective on December 11, 2001. Chinese Taipei's membership
became effective on January 1, 2002. The WTO will then have 144 members.'').
4 Chi Chin-ling and Bear Lee, WTO Approves Taiwan's Membership Application, Central News Agency
(Taiwan), 11 December 2001, available at Lexis, News Library, Allasi File.
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because most countries were concerned about trade relations with China, Taiwan's
accession progress was postponed.5
Taiwan's accession to the WTO is considered to be the most important diplomatic
breakthrough. The government believes that WTO will enable Taiwan to open a new
``window of the century'' and a ``window of the world''.6 Section II of this article
describes Taiwan's application to the WTO and its status as a separate customs territory.
Section III introduces how WTO membership benefits Taiwan. Section IV analyses
cross-strait trade laws and policies of China and Taiwan. Section V examines
interactions between China and Taiwan in the WTO and potential violations of
international trade law they may trigger.
II. TAIWAN AND THE WTO
A. THE ROC AS A FOUNDING MEMBER
In 1946, in order to rebuild the shattered world economy after the Second World
War, the United Nations adopted a resolution calling for the establishment of the
``International Trade Organization'' (ITO) and the United States subsequently drafted
the Charter of the ITO.7 From April to October 1947, the full preparatory conference
convened in Geneva where nations continued discussing the Charter of the ITO as well
as negotiated multilateral tariffs concessions.8 The Republic of China, then on
Mainland China, became one of the 23 contracting parties of the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) concluded at the Geneva Conference by signing the
Final Act of the GATT on 30 October 1947.9 Because some nations require
parliamentary ratification to implement the GATT obligations, the GATT was not
applied until all contracting parties, except Chile, signed the Protocol of Provisional
5 See, e.g., William Dullforce, Taiwan's Bid to Join GATT Hands World Trading Body a Hot Potato, Financial
Times (London), 5 January 1990, p. A3 (``Chinese officials have argued that it was impossible for GATT to contain
two Chinas. Taiwan could join only after China itself had become a member and then only under [Beijing]'s
sponsorshipÐa procedure similar to that under which Hong Kong joined GATT under UK sponsorship''); WTO
Successfully Concludes Negotiations on China's Entry, 17 September 2001, at <http://www.wto.org/english/
news_e/pres01_e/pr243_e.htm> (``All contracting parties had acknowledged . . . that Chinese Taipei, as a separate
customs territory, should not accede to the GATT before the PRC itself.''); see also Doug Bandow, Let Taiwan
enter the WTO first, Taipei Times, 19 January 2001, p. A12 (``With China lagging behind, there is no justification
for holding up Taipei's membership application.'').
6 Chen Shui-bian, Statement on the ROC's Accession to the World Trade Organization, Government
Information Office, 12 November 2001, available at <http://www.gio.gov.tw/taiwan-website/4-oa/20011112/
2001111201.html>.
7 John H. Jackson, The World Trading System: Law and Policy of International Economic Relations (2nd edn, The
Hague and Boston: Kluwer Law International, 1999), pp. 36±37.
8 Ibid., p. 37.
9 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 30 October 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter
GATT]. Twenty original contracting members include Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Burma, Canada, Ceylon (now
Sri Lanka), Chile, China. Cuba, Czechoslovakia, France, India, Lebanon, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New
Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, South Africa, Southern Rhodesia, Syria, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
Yang Guohua and Cheng Fin, The Process of China's Accession to the WTO, 14 J. Int'l Econ. L. 2 (2001), p. 297.
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Application (PPA).10 The ROC provisionally applied the GATT after it signed the
PPA on 21 May 1948.11
For the initial purposes of embodying trade negations and including protective
clauses, the GATT was never designed to be an organization.12 Nevertheless, since the
US Congress refused to approve the Charter of the ITO and thus the ITO never came
into existence,13 the GATT essentially became the only ``organization'' to manage
global trade.
B. THE ROC'S WITHDRAWAL AND THE PRC'S ``RESUMPTION''
Soon after the Communist Party founded the People's Republic of China (PRC),
the defeated ROC government, led by the Nationalist Party (Kuomingtan), moved its
seat to Taiwan in 1949. On 6 March 1950, the ROC on Taiwan notified the UN
Secretary-General of its decision to withdraw from the GATT.14 Several considerations
were behind the ROC's decision. First, most commodities that gained GATT tariff
concessions came from Mainland China and only a few from Taiwan; thus maintaining
the membership would not benefit Taiwan's economy.15 Second, the ROC was
informed that GATT contracting parties would not adopt the favourable tax rate for
Taiwan.16 Third, Taiwan's trade volume was very small in the 1950s, and even without
GATT membership, Taiwan could still obtain preferential tariffs deduction through
bilateral trade agreements with its major trade partners.17 Finally, the ROC could not
fulfil GATT obligations on behalf of the mainland and it would greatly disadvantage
Taiwan to be held responsible for a territory that it no longer controlled.
Only Czechoslovakia challenged the validity of ROC's withdrawal in 1950 on
``China's'' behalf.18 When the ROC applied for observer status in GATT in 1965,
13 countries that switched recognition to the PRC opposed Taiwan's application.
10 Jackson, as note 2 above, p. 223; see Ya Qin, China and GATTÐAccession Instead of Resumption, 27
J.W.T. 2 (April 1993), pp. 77, 79 (``Chile became a GATT contracting party afterwards through accession in
February 1948'').
11 GATT: Status of Legal Instruments, GATT/LEG/1, Supp. No. 13, April 1988, pp. 1±2.3.
12 Jackson, as note 2 above, p. 212. For instance, states are called ``contracting parties'' in the GATT, but are
called ``Members'' in the WTO.
13 See ibid., p. 213 (``The composition of Congress had shifted to a stance less liberal on trade matters and less
internationally oriented. Recognizing the inevitable, in December 1950, the Executive Branch announced that it
would not re-submit the ITO charter to Congress for approval, so for all practical purposes the ITO charter was
dead.'').
14 Communication from Secretary-General of the United Nations Regarding China, GATT Doc. CP/54
(Mar. 6, 1950). See Qin, as note 10 above, p. 79, n. 13 (``The withdrawal took effect on 5 May 1950, 60 days after
the notice, in accordance with Article 5 of the PPA.'').
15 Yang and Chen, as note 9 above, p. 298. Some commentators also argue that the ROC's decision was to
refrain it from being expelled involuntarily and prevent the PRC from entering the GATT. Ibid.; Lori Fisler
Damrosch, GATT Membership in a Changing World Order: Taiwan, China, and the Former Soviet Republics, Colum.
Bus. L. Rev. (1992), pp. 19, 21.
16 Ibid.
17 Ying-jeou Ma, The ROC(Taiwan)'s Entry into the WTO: Progress, Problems and Prospects, 15 Chinese YB of
Int'l & Aff. (1996±97), p. 36.
18 Chung-chou Li, Resumption of China's GATT Membership, 21 J.W.T. (1987), pp. 25, 26.
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Taiwan's observer status was granted since the ROC still held the old China seat in the
UN.19 However, in 1971, the UN passed Resolution 2758, which decided to:
``. . . restore all its rights to the People's Republic of China and to Recognize the Representative
of its Government as the only legitimate representative of China to the United Nations, and to
expel forthwith the representative of Chiang Kai-shek from the place which they unlawfully
occupy at the United Nations and in all the organizations related to it.''20
In the same year, the GATT declared that it would ``follow the decisions of the
United Nations on political matters''.21 Thus, Taiwan's observer status was deprived.
Whether or not the ROC's withdrawal from the GATT is binding on the PRC
remains a myth of international law. The PRC did not have contact with the GATT
until 1982 when its delegation joined the Multi-Fibre Arrangement (MFA) and later in
1982 when it attended the GATT Contracting Parties meeting as an observer.22 The
PRC consistently asserted that the founding of the PRC in 1949 did not alter China's
status as a subject of international law and the withdrawal from GATT in 1950 by the
deposed regime in Taiwan was ``illegal and invalid''.23 Therefore, the PRC insisted on
the ``resumption approach'' that its status should be an ``original contracting party'' to
the GATT, rather than a new member.24
The PRC's ``presumption approach'' is problematic for various reasons. First, the
updated tariff schedule was fundamentally different from that of 1948 when ``China''
was a party. Contracting parties never anticipated that new tariff concessions would
apply between them and China, which had had no contact with the GATT for more
than 30 years. Second, contracting parties would not be able to invoke ``opt out'' or
``non-application'' provisions under Article XXXV25 under which a party is entitled to
refuse to apply all of its GATT obligations to a new member entering the GATT under
Article XXXIII. The inability to invoke Article XXXV against China would
particularly affect the United States. The Jackson-Vanik Amendment to the US
Trade Act of 1974 imposed restrictions on granting most-favoured-nation (MFN)
19 Id.
20 U.N. GAOR, 26th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/8429 (1971).
21 GATT Doc. SR. 27/2 (19 November 1971).
22 Yang and Chen, as note 9 above, p. 301.
23 Qin, as note 10 above, p. 81.
24 Ibid. See Yang and Chen, as note 9 above, p. 301 (``In November 1982, the PRC for the first time sent a
delegation to attend the 38th GATT Contracting Parties Conference as an observer. There, the Chinese delegates
pointed out in a speech that `China is one of the original Contracting Parties of the GATT.' . . . Then the delegates
of China had an exchange of views with the GATT secretariat on some legal problems of `China's resumption of
the status as a Contracting Party'''); Harold K. Jacobson and Michael Oksenberg, China's Participating in the IMF, the
World Bank, and GATT: Toward a Global Economic Order (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1989). P.
89 (stating that China ``recognized that conditions had changed substantially since 1950 and that the members of
GATT had made many reciprocal concessions since then. China would be willing to negotiate the conditions of its
full participation in GATT and to sign a protocol of accession'').
25 See GATT Article XXXV (``This Agreement . . . shall not apply as between any contracting party and any
other contracting party if . . . (b) either of contracting parties, at the time either becomes a contracting party, does
not consent to such application . . .'').
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treatment to non-market-economy countries, including China.26 However, the law
was in violation of Article I MFN provision, mandating that ``any advantage, favor,
privilege or immunity granted by any contracting party . . . shall be accorded
immediately and conditionally to . . . all other contracting parties''.27 In other words,
should China ``resume'' its status as original contracting party, the United States could
no longer invoke the law barring the MFN application to China. Finally, from an
international law perspective, even presuming that the ROC's withdrawal has no effect
on ``China'', the long-term non-application between the PRC and contracting parties
had led to ``suspension'' or ``termination'' of the GATT based on the Vienna
Convention on the Laws of Treaties.28 As a result, Professor John H. Jackson, a leading
trade law scholar, concluded, ``it was agreed that for the PRC's `reentry' into the
GATT, the accession procedures would be used''.29
C. SEPARATE CUSTOMS TERRITORY OF TAIWAN IN THE WTO
After the PRC notified the Director-General of the GATT requesting resumption
of its status as an original contracting member on 10 July 1986,30 the ROC on Taiwan
filed its application for membership with the GATT under Article XXXIII of the
GATT under the name of ``Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen
and Matsu'' (TPKM) on 1 January 1990.31 Given Taiwan's complicated international
status, choosing this tedious name serves two major purposes. First, using the name
could avoid the political issue involving sovereignty, known as the ``one China''
problem.32 It was simply an illusion that the GATT would accept Taiwan under its
official name, ``Republic of China''. Second, applying as a ``Separate Customs
Territory'' shows that the ROC is the government which has effective autonomy over
Taiwan, and its outlying islands, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu and the government has
26 Jackson, as note 2 above, p. 237; Jacobson and Oksenberg, as note 24 above, p. 95; see also PNTRÐThe
Next Step for the United States, China Bus. Rev. (January±February 2000), available at <http://
www.chinabusinessreview.com/public/0001/wtoptnr.html> (``This amendment was originally directed at the
Soviet Union because of restrictions on emigration of certain Soviet citizens. But the Jackson-Vanik amendment
applies to all non-market economies. Thus, for the United States to enjoy WTO benefits with respect to China
after PRC accession, Congress must amend or repeal Jackson-Vanik to permit extension of PNTR to China.'');
House Report 106-632, Permanent Normal Trade Relations with the People's Republic of China, available at <http://
thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/cpquery/?&db_id=cp106&r_n=hr632.106&sel=TOC_46883&> (stating that President's
waiver ``may be disapproved through passage by Congress of a joint resolution of disapproval within 60
calendar days after the expiration of the previous waiver authority. Congress may override a Presidential veto
within the later of the end of the 60 calendar day period for initial passage or 15 legislative days after the veto.'').
27 GATT Article I.
28 See Qin, as note 10 above, pp. 87±89 (explaining the legal effects of suspension and termination of
treaties).
29 Jackson, as note 2 above, p. 236.
30 Yang and Cheng, as note 9 above, p. 302.
31 Hungdah Chiu, Taiwan's Membership in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 10 Chinese YB Int'l L. &
Aff. (1990±91), p. 201.
32 Although Professor Hungdah Chiu pointed out that the ROC did not intend to use the name ``Taiwan''
alone in its application because this would imply that Taiwan is a country independent of the Chinese mainland,
which is both contrary to the ROC national policy of unification and provocative to the PRC, ibid., it is certainly
not the case in current pro-independence Taiwanese leaders' eyes.
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independent external relations and, most importantly, can act on its behalf rather than
depending on the PRC's approval.
According to its ``one China'' principle, the PRC fiercely opposed Taiwan's
application for GATT membership. Hou Zhitong, the PRC's representative to the
GATT, wrote to Director-General of the GATT Arthur Dunkel, arguing that Taiwan's
application was ``utterly illegal'' and should not be considered.33 On 19 October 1989,
the spokesman of the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that after the ``restoration''
of Chinese membership in the GATT, there might be a possibility for Taiwan to join
the GATT.34 From the PRC's standpoint, Taiwan is a province of China or a would-be
``Special Administrative Region'' as Hong Kong and Macau; thus Taiwan's application
as a Separate Customs Territory was considered ``invalid de jure'' without a proper
``confirmation of the PRC government''.35 Furthermore, the PRC feared that
surrendering its sovereignty over the Taiwan issue to the world trade body would
constitute foreign interference with China's domestic affairs and thus promote Taiwan's
independence.36
Contrary to the PRC's assertion, I argue that the status of Taiwan under the
GATT is inherently different from that of Hong Kong. Requirements for GATT
membership are different from those for most international organizations. While the
latter generally require ``states'', the GATT requires ``governments''. Article XXXII
clearly states that ``. . . the contracting parties to this Agreement shall be understood to
mean those governments''.37 Two articles of GATT, Article XXVI and Article
XXXIII, govern governments' accession. It may seem subtle from the differences
between their abbreviations: ``Chinese Taipei'' and ``Hong Kong, China''. However,
the distinction can be demonstrated by the fact that Hong Kong gained GATT
membership under Article XXVI(5) through the United Kingdom's sponsorship, but
Taiwan's application as a new member was based on Article XXXIII.
Article XXVI(5)(a) states that ``each government accepting the Agreement does so
in respect of its metropolitan territory and of the other territories for which it has
international responsibility'',38 and Article XXVI(5)(c) provides that ``any of the
customs territories . . . possesses or acquires full autonomy in the conduct of external
33 Ibid.; see also Susanna Chan, Taiwan's Application to the GATT: A New Urgency with the Conclusion of the
Uruguay Round, 2 Ind. J. Global Legal Stud. 1 (Fall 1993), pp. 275, 284 (stating the PRC's position that ``(1) there is
one china, (2) the PRC government is the official government of China, (3) the ROC's application contravenes
these beliefs'').
34 Chiu, as note 31 above, p. 202.
35 Lei Wang, Separate Customs Territory in GATT and Taiwan's Request for GATT Membership, 25 J.W.T. 5
(October 1991), pp. 17, 19.
36 See Chan, as note 33 above, p. 285 (stating that the PRC feared that ``acceptance of the ROC's application
will promote international recognition of the ROC as the legitimate government of China'' and that ``reunification
between Taiwan and China would become even more remote if the GATT recognizes the strength of Taiwan's
economy''); Charles Wolf Jr et al., Fault Lines in China's Economic Terrain (RAND, 2003), p. 160 (arguing that
``from the PRC's standpoint, continuance of the status quo, including Taiwan's admission to the WTO as a
customs entity, may enhance Taiwan's de facto stature as an independent state'').
37 GATT Article XXXII.
38 GATT Article XXVI(5)(a).
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commercial relationships shall, upon sponsorship through a declaration by the
responsible contracting party, . . . be deemed to be a contracting party''.39 These
provisions generally apply to countries, which were colonies of a contracting party and
later gained independence.40 The parent state applied for, or ``sponsored'', GATT
memberships on behalf of its colonies.
Under this article, the United Kingdom, as Hong Kong's metropolitan power,
sponsored Hong Kong for GATT membership in its own right. Hong Kong thus
became a contracting party on 23 April 1986.41 In addition, the PRC confirmed that
Hong Kong would continue to possess full autonomy in its external commercial
relations in compliance with Article XXXVI requirements after the reversion of Hong
Kong to China in 1997.42 Beijing accepted the continuation of Hong Kong's GATT
separate membership due to the acknowledgment of the PRC's sovereignty over Hong
Kong. Macau's status in the GATT was also based on a similar arrangement between
China and Portugal.43
Taiwan is Hong Kong or Macau neither in fact nor in law. Taiwan is by no means
a colony and does not need a ``metropolitan power'' to sponsor its application for
GATT membership.44 Taiwan's legal basis is Article XXXIII. As ``a government acting
on behalf of a separate customs territory possessing full autonomy in the conduct of its
external commercial relations and of the other matters provided for [under the
GATT]'', the ROC government shall, and is entitled to, apply for membership ``on its
own behalf to or on behalf of [its] territory''.45 I call this article international trade law's
Montevideo Convention. The issue now is who can join the club. Taiwan, as Article
XXIV(2) defines a customs territory, certainly has ``separate tariffs or other regulations
of commerce'', and maintains ``a substantial part of trade'' with other countries.46
Taiwan's tariffs and laws, as well as its external relations, are not subject to the PRC's
``confirmation''. Moreover, diplomatic recognition is not an obstacle to bar Taiwan's
membership because contracting parties are ``concerned only with what [is] relevant to
39 GATT Article XXVI(5)(c).
40 Jackson, as note 2 above, p. 232; see also ibid., pp. 232±233 (``[T]he sponsored new member would apply
the General Agreement as its parent sponsor was applying it on the date of sponsorship . . .'').
41 Li, as note 18 above, p. 43.
42 See also ibid. (stating that according to the UK±PRC Agreement, the PRC promised that ``the Hong
Kong Administrative Region shall be a separate customs territory. It may practice in relevant international
organizations and international trade agreements'', including the GATT).
43 China's Accession to the WTO and its Relationship to the Chinese Taipei Accession and to Hong Kong and Macau,
China, March 2001, available at <http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/acc_e/chinabknot_feb01.doc> (discussing
that Macau acceded to the GATT based on Portugal's sponsorship in accordance with Article XXVI:5(c) and
China agreed to maintain Macau's autonomy in exercising foreign trade relations after China ``resume the exercise
of sovereignty over Macau'').
44 See Chan, as note 33 above, p. 286 (``Unlike Hong Kong, Taiwan has never been in the GATT as a
colony or dependent territory represented by its suzerain state; in view of the different economic and trade systems
on the two sides [of the Taiwan Strait], it is inappropriate for the mainland to accede on Taiwan's behalf when its
seat is restored in the GATT.'').
45 GATT Article XXXIII.
46 GATT Article XXIV.
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the General Agreement'', and not the ``status of international law''.47 Therefore, the
PRC's claim that Taiwan's accession depends on China's sponsorship was baseless
under international law. This proposition also supports my previous argument that
Taiwan is not a part of the PRC and the PRC, as one side of the divided China, cannot
represent the ROC.
On 29 September 1992, the GATT Council established a working party to
examine Taiwan's application.48 The compromise regarding Taiwan's status was
reached in September 1992 when the chairman at the GATT Council meeting declared
that:49
``All contracting parties acknowledged the view that there is only one China . . . [and M]any
contracting parties, therefore, agreed with the view of the People's Republic of China (PRC)
that Chinese Taipei, as a separate customs territory, should not accede to the GATT before the PRC itself
. . . [T]he Council should examine the report of the Working Party on China and adopt the
Protocol for the PRC's accession before examining the report and adopting the Protocol for
Chinese Taipei, while noting that the working party reports should be examined independently.''
(emphasis added)
At the end of the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations in 1994, GATT
contracting parties signed the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization
(WTO Agreement).50 A new organization, the WTO, was created to manage GATT
and other trade-related agreements.51 The WTO followed the GATT's ``decisions,
procedures, and customary practices''.52 Therefore, on 1 January 1995, Taiwan
changed the legal authority under which its application was made from Article XXXIII
of the GATT to Article XII of the WTO Agreement53 and the GATT working party
thus was changed to the WTO working party.54
During the 12-year painstaking marathon of its membership application, Taiwan
completed bilateral negotiations with 30 WTO Members and the working party on
Chinese Taipei's accession conducted eleven official meetings and four official meetings.55
The WTO Ministerial Meeting approved Taiwan's application on 11 November 2001,
47 GATT SR 19/12 1961, 195±961; see also Cho Hui-Wan, Taiwan's Application to GATT/WTO:
Significance of Multilateralism for an Unrecognized State (New York: Praeger, 2002), p. 175 (discussing the background
of this statement).
48 Background Information on Taiwan's WTO Application, Board of Foreign Trade, 13 November 2001, at
<http://www.gio.gov.tw/taiwan-website/4-oa/wto/wtoacc.htm>.
49 Analytical Index, Guide to GATT Law and Practice 943-44 (GATT/WTO: 1994).
50 Legal Texts: WTO Agreement, available at <http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/final_e.htm> (4
March 2005); see Jackson, as note 2 above, p. 219 (discussing the differences between the ITO and the WTO).
51 The WTO structure consists of the WTO Charter, Annex 1 multilateral agreements (Annex 1A the
GATT of 1994, Annex 1B General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), and Annex 1C Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPs)), Annex 2 dispute settlement rules, Annex 3 rules
governing the Trade Policy Review Mechanism (TPRM), and Annex 4 optional agreements. Jackson, as note 2
above, pp. 219±220.
52 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 15 April 1994, Article XVI(1), 1867
U.N.T.S. 154, 33 I.L.M. 1144 (1994) (hereinafter WTO Agreement).
53 See WTO Agreement Article XII (stating that the WTO membership is open to ``any state or separate
customs territory'').
54 WTO document WT/ACC/TPKM/1, January 1995.
55 The ROC's Accession to the WTO, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, available at <http://www.mofa.gov.tw/
fp.asp?xItem=10685&ctnode=292> (last visited 30 July 2004).
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and the next day, ROC Economic Affairs Minister Lin Hsin-yi signed the accession
protocol.56 On 8 March 2002, WTO Director-General Mike Moore met Yen Ching-
Chang, Taiwan's first WTO representative, and Taiwan's WTO permanent mission was
officially established.57
D. WTO: ANOTHER DIPLOMATIC BATTLE BETWEEN TAIWAN AND CHINA
After China became the 143rd Member and Taiwan became the 144th Member,58
the WTO became another diplomatic battle for these ``two Chinas''. It is noteworthy
that the PRC's attitude toward Taiwan's accession to the global trade organization
changed from opposition to Taiwan's GATT membership to a position that ``Taiwan
can only accede to the WTO after the PRC's entry''. There are several reasons
underlying the policy change. First, Taiwan's entry to the WTO is inevitable since
major trading powers would gain great economic benefits from Taiwan's accession,
such as opening its agriculture and services market and lowering its protective tariffs.
China and Taiwan are the World's 5th and 14th largest exporters, and 6th and 16th
largest importers, respectively.59 As both states are important economies, it is not of
interest to WTO Members to accept China at the cost of sacrificing Taiwan. Second, as
WTO membership is not only open to a ``state'', but also a ``separate customs
territory'', the PRC can interpret Taiwan's WTO status as that of Hong Kong and
Macau, which is consistent with the ``one China'' principle. For these reasons, China
often translated ``Chinese Taipei'' into Chinese as ``China Taipei'' whereas Taiwan
translated the name as ``Chunghua Taipei''. In fact, from the PRC's stance, the ``one
county, four seats'' formula has become the ``one country, two systems'' version under
the WTO. Finally, the PRC may push Taiwan to open ``three-links'',60 i.e., direct
trade, shipping transportation, and postal services under the WTO framework and thus
achieve the purpose of ``promoting reunification through economic integration''.
Coexistence of two political rivals in the WTO is never easy. China sees Taiwan's
every move as a step towards ``proof of independence''. Taiwan, on the contrary, tries
56 Chi and Chang, as note 1 above. Taiwan sent the notification of the accession protocol ratification to the
WTO on 2 December 2001 and although the day was a Sunday, WTO agreed to accept it to facilitate Taiwan's
admission. Sofia Wu, Taiwan will Deposit WTO Accession Accord, Central News Agency (Taiwan), 18 November
2001, available at Lexis, News Library, Allasi File.
57 Information on the website of the Permanent Mission of Taiwan to the WTO, at <http://
www.taiwanwto.ch/about_mission/history.html> (last visited 16 August 2004).
58 See Jackson, as note 2 above, p. 219 (``China announced that it would deposit its formal acceptance of the
WTO Agreement. As such, Chinese membership became effective on 11 December 2001. Chinese Taipei's
membership became effective on January 1, 2002.''); According to ROC law, treaties should be ratified by the
Congress (Legislative Yuan).
59 According to WTO Report, Taiwan Exports Ranks 14th-largest in 2002, Taiwan News, Central News Agency
(Taiwan), 7 November 2003, available at Lexis, News Library, Allasi File.
60 See, e.g., Article 29, Act Governing Relations Between Peoples of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland
Area, available at <http://www.mac.gov.tw/english/index1-e.htm> (last visited 20 February 2005) (hereinafter
Cross-Strait Act) (``Unless permitted by the competent authorities, no Mainland vessels, civil aircraft or other
means of transportation may enter into the restricted or prohibited waters of the Taiwan Area or the controlled
airspace of the Taipei Flight Information Region.'').
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to ``politicize and internationalize'' trade issues in order to prove the autonomy of its
government separate from China. China consistently attempts to downgrade Taiwan's
status in the WTO. In 1999, after Taiwan's application for WTO membership gained
widespread support, the PRC proposed to add ``China's'' to the name ``Separate
Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu''.61 Again, in 2000, the
PRC submitted proposed language to its working party stating ``Taiwan is a separate
customs territory of China''.62 The PRC did not succeed due to most Members'
opposition.63 Even after Taiwan's entry into the WTO, in February 2003, as a direct
result of the PRC's pressure, WTO Director-General Supachai Panitchpakdi
demanded that Taiwan mission change the name from ``Permanent Mission of the
Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu'' to ``economic
and trade office'', parallel to the title used by Hong Kong and Macau, claiming that
Taiwan's current title has ``sovereignty implications''.64 Until now, Taiwan's current
title as the ``permanent mission'' remained unchanged. However, because of the name
dispute over Taiwan's title, the WTO has not updated the correspondence directory,
also known as the ``blue book'', since February 2002.65 The WTO Secretariat used to
specify the origin of submitted documents by ``permanent mission''.66 It is suggested
that in order not to get involved in the name dispute, the WTO Secretariat now use
``delegation'', instead of ``permanent mission''.67
China's request was not legally justified for the following reasons. First, China's
demand was based on statements with respect to Taiwan's status made by the 1992
GATT Council chairman that Taiwan's representation ``would be along the same lines
as that of Hong Kong and Macau'' and its title ``would not have any implication on the
issue of sovereignty''.68 However, the Council never adopted this statement. Instead,
the Council simply indicated, as the minutes show, that ``the Council took note of the
statement''.69 As mentioned above, the term ``took note of'', like ``acknowledge'' or
61 Cho Hui-Wan, Stick to the Name Taiwan Knows, Taipei Times, 24 October 2003, p. A8.
62 Nadia Tsao, ``Customs Territory'' is nixed by Clinton, Taipei Times, 8 September 2000, p. A1.
63 See ibid. (``US Senator Jon Kyl, along with 30 other senators, wrote President Clinton to urge the
administration to reject China's demand and President Bill Clinton indicated that the US would not accept
Beijing's proposal to label Taiwan as a `customs territory of China' in WTO documents.'').
64 Taiwan's WTO Status Unchanged, Representative Says, Taiwan News, 27 May 2004, Global News Wire-Asia
Africa Intelligence Wire; see also Laurence Eyton, Status Quo: Beijing, Taipei and the WTO, Asia Times, 24 June
2003, at <http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/EF24Ad02.html> (stating Supachai's ``three demands: that the title
of Taiwan's mission be changed to `office', which is the title used by Hong Kong and Macau; that member of the
Taiwan mission refrain from using the customary diplomatic titles and ranks; and that Taiwan refrain from using
any words in WTO-related documents . . . that imply that Taiwan is a sovereign country'').
65 Taiwan-China Fight Delays Update of WTO Directory, Taiwan Headlines, 3 June 2004, available at <http://
th.gio.gov.tw/list.cfm?class=Wto#>.
66 The WTO Secretariat Changed the Document Procedure (Chinese), 30 November 2003, available at <http://
www.epochtimes.com/gb/3/11/30/n420836.htm>.
67 Id.
68 Tony Juan and Cho Hui-wan, WTO Secretariat's Demands Offbase, Taipei Times, 10 June 2002, p. A8.
69 See ibid. (``The minutes record, `The Council so agreed'. However, after the chairman made the above-
mentioned statements on the status and title of the Chinese Taipei delegation, the record merely indicates, `The
Council took note of the statement'''.).
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``respect'', has no significant legal implications. Foreign states deliberately chose these
terms when referring to the PRC's view that Taiwan is part of China.
In addition, WTO membership applications of both China and Taiwan were
based on Article XII of the WTO Agreement. Pursuant to Article XII, ``any States or
customs territory . . . may accede this Agreement''.70 It is clear that the WTO deems
these two entities to possess same capacities and do not distinguish rights between
them. The Explanatory Note of the WTO Agreement, which provides that ``the terms
`country' or `countries' . . . include separate customs territory Members'', supports this
position. This conclusion also reflects the traditional view that WTO law, indifferent to
the definition of states, is only concerned with government capacity. As most Members
use the titles of ``permanent missions'', Taiwan, which has the same government
capacity as other Members, is entitled to equal treatment.
Another relevant question is whether or not the head of Taiwan's delegation can
use official diplomatic ranks such as ``ambassador'' or ``counsellor'' in addition to the
formal WTO title of ``representative''. WTO law provides no guidance. Because
Taiwan and Switzerland, where the WTO Secretariat sits, have no formal relations,
Taiwan's diplomats are not entitled to use diplomatic titles. In practice, nonetheless,
most Members address Taiwan's WTO representative as ambassador.
III. REASONS FOR JOINING THE WTO
A. TO EXPAND SUBSTANTIVE DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS
The ROC has been diplomatically isolated since it lost its United Nations seat in
1971. China, based on its version of the ``one China'' principle, has vigorously opposed
Taiwan's efforts to develop diplomatic relations or to join international organizations.
Therefore, ``Taiwan's survival depends on, for the time being, preserving the ambiguity
of its status''.71 As to relations with foreign states, the PRC has consistently rejected
``dual recognition'', compelling foreign states to choose between the PRC and the
ROC. Similarly, many international organizations have faced the ``two Chinas''
dilemma. Most international organizations decided to follow the ``Olympic Formula'',
i.e., preserving or accepting Taiwan's membership with its name changing from ``the
Republic of China'' to ``Chinese Taipei''.72 The GATT and the WTO also followed
this ``custom''.
Although Taiwan has active ``non-official'' and ``commercial'' relations with major
countries, its ``invisibility'' in the international arena led to lack of official
70 WTO Agreement Article XII.
71 Gary Klintworth, New Taiwan, New China: Taiwan's Changing Role in the Asia-Pacific Region 20 (Sydney:
Longman, 1995), p. 20.
72 Gerald Chan, China and International Organizations: Participation in Non-Governmental Organizations Since
1971 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 44 (``[T]aiwan Olympic committee of Taiwan would be
named the `Chinese Taipei Olympic Committee'. Its anthem, flag, and emblem would have to be changed . . .'').
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communication with foreign governments. While it is true that the WTO is not a
political organization in essence, it does provide a forum in which Taiwan can
efficiently exchange economic, and even political opinions, with other Members.
Therefore, the ROC government's efforts to accede to the WTO were primarily
driven by this political consideration.
In 2004, to safeguard its agricultural interests, Taiwan joined the G-10 Group,
which consists of ten major food-importing economies, aimed at the common goal for
agricultural negotiations in Doha Round trade talks.73 For this reason, Taiwan's
Council of Agriculture Chairman Lee Ching-lung was invited to attend a G-10 Group
agricultural ministers' meeting on 5 July 2004, which was presided over by Swiss
President Joseph Deiss.74 The G-10 Group would also hold consultation meetings with
food-exporting economies such as the United States, the European Union, the G-20
Group of developed nations and a 42-developing country ``Special Products Union''.75
Having a similar opportunity to negotiate with major countries was a ``mission
impossible'' for Taiwan in the past, but now the WTO enables Taiwan to play a ``key
minority'' role and to step out of its diplomatic isolation.
B. TO SECURE PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT IN FOREIGN MARKETS
Taiwan's WTO membership can reinforce its rights to receive unconditional
most-favoured-nation (MFN) treatment and national treatment. The MFN treatment,
set forth in Article I of the GATT, requires that all members should be granted such
status. National treatment, based on Article III, requires import countries accord no less
favourable treatment to products from other countries than like products produced
domestically. Therefore, foreign states cannot use discriminatory, or unfair, trade
practices to prevent Taiwanese products from entering their market. This protection is
particularly important to a trade-oriented nation such as Taiwan.
After Taiwan's withdrawal in 1950, the nation, as a non-contracting party, still
enjoyed the MFN status and tariff-deductions through the United States based on the
bilateral 1948 Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation.76 Taiwan's trade
dependency on the US market rose rapidly from 53.1 percent in 1970 to 74.3 percent
in 1990.77 During the same period, exports to the United States accounted for
approximately 40 percent of Taiwan's exports and 20 percent of Taiwan's GDP.78 The
73 C.H. Lu and P.C. Tang, Taiwan Invited to Attend G-10 Group Ministerial Meeting, Central News Agency
(Taiwan), 25 June 2004, available at Lexis, News Library, Allasi File; Neil Lu and P.C. Tang, Taiwan and G-10
Group Members to Hope Talks with major WTO Members, Central News Agency (Taiwan), 23 March 2004, available
at Lexis, News Library, Allasi File.
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 Cho, as note 47 above, p. 77; see also ibid., p. 77 (discussing that according to the Taiwan Relations Act
1979, the treaty was still valid in US law).
77 Table 5.1 Trade Dependence of Taiwan and the United States, 1970±1990; ibid., p. 82.
78 Table 5.2 Ratio of Bilateral Trade and Exports to GNP and Total Exports, 1970±1990 (Percentage); ibid.,
p. 83.
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EEC became Taiwan's second largest export market in 1988.79 As Taiwan had great
trade surpluses with both the United States and the EU, these two parties frequently
used the threat of restrictions of their markets as a bargaining ploy during trade
negotiations.80 After Taiwan's entry to the WTO, WTO law will guarantee Taiwan's
access to its export markets.
C. TO HAVE ACCESS TO THE WTO DISPUTE RESOLUTION MECHANISM
As a WTO Member, Taiwan will obtain access to the WTO dispute resolution
mechanism, which is widely recognized as ``a central element in providing security and
predictability to the multilateral trading system''.81 Dispute resolution procedures are
set forth in the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes (DSU). Should any country, such as Taiwan, consider its rights under the
WTO to be infringed, its government is entitled to ask the infringing party to ``accord
sympathetic consideration'' and ``afford adequate for consultation''.82 Furthermore, a
complaining party can request to establish a Panel83 to deal with trade disputes and can
further appeal the Panel's decision to the Appellate Body.84 The winning party is to be
granted ``authorization to suspend concessions or other obligations'' against the losing
party.85 Because of the WTO's compulsory jurisdiction and effective implementation,
commentators frequently refer the WTO dispute resolution mechanism as the ``world
trade court''.86
Prior to Taiwan's accession to the WTO, most countries afforded Taiwan's
products similar treatment as those products from other countries. However, such
treatment was based on ``international comity'', rather than legal obligation. The fact
that these countries were able to alter or terminate such treatment unilaterally would
severely affect export-oriented countries, such as Taiwan. The following example is
illustrative. In 1999, Argentina and Poland unilaterally adopted import-limited
measures against some of Taiwan's textile products.87 Upon entry to the WTO,
79 Ibid., p. 86.
80 See ibid., p. 88 (``Under US pressure, the ROC government further opened its domestic market
exclusively for American oranges, grapefruit, grapes, pears, peaches, and tobacco, as well as backing and insurance
services . . . [T]he EEC followed the US pattern of negotiation with Taiwan; it threatened to withdraw favorable
treatment or unilaterally impose import restrictions . . .'').
81 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, WTO Agreement,
Annex 2, 15 April 1994, Article 3.2, 33 I.L.M. 1226 (1994) (hereinafter DSU).
82 DSU Article 4.2.
83 See DSU Article 6.1 (``If the complaining party so requests, a panel shall be established at the last at the
DSB meeting . . . unless at that meeting the DSB decides by consensus not to establish a panel'').
84 DSU Article 17.
85 DSU Article 22.1; see Jackson, as note 2 above, p. 266 (``In this practice, the DSU modifies past GATT
practice. Article XXIII permitted the losing party to authorize the prevailing party to retaliate if the losing party
ends its violation of GATT rules. Such authorization was granted only once, however . . .'').
86 E.g., John A. Ragosta, Unmasking the WTOÐAccess to the DSB System: Can the WTO DSB Live up to the
Moniker ``World Trade Court''?, 31 L. & Pol'y Int'l Bus. (2000), p. 766; John Ragosta et. al., WTO Dispute Settlement:
The System is Flawed and Must be Fixed, 37 Int'l Lawyer (2000), p. 697.
87 Annual Review on Taiwan's Accession to the WTO and Prospects, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, available at
<http://www.mofa.gov.tw/fp.asp?xItem=10680&ctnode=292> (last visited 30 July 2004).
TAIWAN'S STATUS IN THE WTO 1207
Taiwan requested that according to WTO law, these two countries either cancel such
measures or propose a gradual termination plan in six months.88 Both Argentina and
Poland, understanding that their policies are repugnant to WTO law and would only
benefit them temporarily, formally notified Taiwan of their decisions that such
measures would be terminated by 2002.89
Realizing the importance of understanding the law and practice of the WTO
dispute resolution procedure, the Taiwan government has increasingly participated
in dispute proceedings. For instance, as of January 2004, Taiwan has taken part in 12
trade dispute settlement cases as a third party, including those involving WTO
Members accusing the United States of flouting global trade rules by adopting
safeguard measures on imports of certain steel products.90
IV. CROSS-STRAIT TRADE RELATIONS
Trade relations between Taiwan and China virtually did not exist for two decades
after the ROC government relocated to Taiwan following the civil war in 1949. Due
to Taiwan's restrictions, direct trade with China has been illegal in Taiwan.
Nonetheless, beginning in the 1980s, indirect cross-strait trade, usually through
Hong Kong or Japan, began rising rapidly.91 Between 1985 and 2003, the value of total
trade between Taiwan and China increased by 420 percent, jumping from US$ 1.1
billion to US$ 46.3 billion.92 Ironically, these two political rivals became crucial trade
partners with each other. For China, Taiwan is the third largest origin of foreign capital,
preceded by Hong Kong and the United States.
The Chinese market became even more important to Taiwanese firms. China
became Taiwan's number one source of trade surplus.93 From 1991 to 2003, the
Investment Commission of the ROC Ministry of Affairs approved 31,151 cases of
Taiwan companies' investments in China with a total value of US$ 34.3 billion.94 In
2004, China absorbed approximately 50 percent of Taiwan's outbound capital flow.95
88 Id.
89 Id.
90 C.H. Lu and P.C. Tang, Taiwan Actively Preparing to Deal with Possible Trade Disputes in WTO, Central
News Agency (Taiwan), 5 January 2004, available at Lexis, News Library, Allasi File.
91 Shin-Yi Peng, Economic Relations Between Taiwan and Southeast Asia: A Review of Taiwan's ``Go South''
Policy, 16 Wis. Int'l L.J. (2003), pp. 639, 641 (``In March 1995, Hong Kong replaced the United States as Taiwan's
largest single export destination. Of course, Hong Kong is not the true end destination. Of all Taiwan's exports to
Hong Kong about 90% go on to Mainland China'').
92 Table 6 Estimation of Trade between Taiwan and Mainland China, Mainland Affairs Council, available at
<www.mac.gov.tw/big5/statistic/em/145/6.pdf> (10 March 2005).
93 A Brief Introduction to Taiwan: Taiwan-China Relations, at <http://www.roc-taiwan.org/taiwan/5-gp/brief/
info04_5.html> (11 August 2004).
94 Table 10 Taiwan Investment in Mainland China, Mainland Affairs Council, available at
<www.mac.gov.tw/big5/statistic/em/145/10.pdf> (10 March 2005).
95 Table 13 Taiwan Approved Outward Investment by Country (Area), Mainland Affairs Council, available
at <www.mac.gov.tw/big5/statistic/em/145/13.pdf> (10 March 2005).
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Taiwan's export dependency on China stood at 25.8 percent,96 making Taiwan the
country with the highest trade dependency on China.97
Given the complex relations between China and Taiwan, cross-strait trade
relations are not purely economic, but are intertwined with politics. Both sides see
cross-strait relations as a bargaining power to leverage their political goals. As neither
China nor Taiwan invoked the Article XIII non-application clause of the WTO
Agreement98 prior to entry into the WTO, which requested trade agreements not to
apply to bilateral relations, WTO membership for China and Taiwan will inevitably
change cross-strait trade relations. Taiwan's WTO obligations will require the country
to substantially revise its current laws restricting cross-strait trade, according China
non-discriminatory treatment in compliance with the MFN principle of the WTO.
Whether Taiwan can see China as normal trade partner remains to be seen.
A. CHINA'S TRADE POLICY ON TAIWAN
China's policy on Taiwan changed from ``armed liberation'' to ``peaceful
reunification'' in the 1980s.99 Chinese leaders demanded that Taiwan lift cross-strait
trade barriers and called for immediate ``three links'' including direct trade, shipping
transportation, and postal services. China's policy serves a twofold purpose. First, the
policy is beneficial to China's economic reform because China can receive Taiwan's
foreign capital and Taiwan's investment can help China increase domestic employment
and develop export industries. Second, increasing economic interactions with China
will make Taiwan dependent on the Chinese market, giving China more leverage in
achieving its reunification goal. For instance, the Chinese government claimed to adopt
retaliatory actions against Taiwan's ``green businessmen'' who have investments in
China, yet support Taiwan independence.100 Chinese scholars also suggested that
China's economic sanctions against Taiwan can paralyse Taiwan's economy.
96 Pei-Jun Tang, 2004 Taiwan's Trade Dependency on China±25.8% (in Chinese), 17 March 2005, available at
<http://news.yam.com/cna/fn/200503/20050317563149.html>.
97 Taiwan's Trade Dependency on Mainland China is the Highest in the World (in Chinese) (4 December 2003), at
<http://jczs.sina.com.cn/2003-12-04/168434.html>.
98 See WTO Agreement Article XIII, sec. 1 (``This Agreement and the Multilateral Trade Agreements in
Annexes 1 and 2 shall not apply as between any Member and any other Member if either of the Members, at the
time either becomes a Member, does not consent to such application.''); Ma, as note 17 above (detailing possible
consequences should Taiwan invoke Article XIII prior to its accession to the WTO).
99 The significant policy change from Mao Zedong's ``liberating Taiwan with military means'' was first
signalled by Ye Jianying's ``Message to Compatriot in Taiwan'' in 1979. The new policy also served as the basis of
Deng Xiaoping's ``one country, two systems'' formula. Jiang Zemin's eight-point statement in 1995 reiterated the
policy, calling for ``promot[ing] economic cooperation between the two sides and avoid[ing] politics interfering
with economic affairs''. Tse-Kang Leng, The Taiwan-China Connection: Democracy and Development Across the Taiwan
Straits (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1996), pp. 38±41; Gang Lin, ``The Changing Relations across the Taiwan Strait'',
in Xiaobing Li et al. (eds), Interpreting US-China-Taiwan Relations: China in the Post-Cold War Era (Lanham, MD:
University Press of America, 1998), pp. 128±129.
100 See Taipei Warns Beijing against Economic Bans, China Post, 5 June 2004, available at Lexis, News Library,
Allasi File (reporting that the Chinese government ``does not welcome Taiwan companies that support the Taiwan
independence movement. The overseas edition of the People's Daily subsequently named Chi Mei Group
chairman Shi Wen-long as a `green Taiwan businessman' because of his close ties with President Chen Shui-bian,
who is concurrently DPP chairman'').
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In 1988, for the economic and political ends, China's State Council promulgated
the Regulations for Encouraging Investment by Taiwan Compatriots, which granted
Taiwan enterprises preferential treatment, including tax deduction and exemption. In
1994, the National People's Congress passed the Taiwan Compatriot Investment
Protection Law. Furthermore, each province or city has authority to enact more
specific regulations to attract Taiwan enterprises.
Most provisions in the forgoing laws are parallel to those laws that govern foreign
enterprises. Lacking detailed regulations on procedural requirements, Taiwanese and
foreign enterprises are vulnerable to changes of policies or ``internal regulations'' of
governments at different levels. For instance, both Article 4 of the Taiwan Compatriot
Investment Protection Law and Article 5 of the Wholly Foreign Owned Enterprise
Law provide that China ``shall not nationalize or requisition'' enterprises with Taiwan
or foreign capital.101 Yet, the protection is subject to ``special circumstances'' or the
need of ``public interests''.102 Chinese law provides no guidance on the legal procedures
or the definitions as to these vague provisions.
It is also noteworthy that China's trade measures on Taiwan are premised on
political considerations. For instance, Article 6 of the Trade Management Regulation
on the Taiwan Area provides that ``Taiwan-related contracts and goods shall not
contain words or symbols in violation of the one China principle''.103 Furthermore,
Chinese courts do not extend mutual recognition to Taiwan's judgments or arbitral
decisions. All verdicts from Taiwan courts are required to be ``politically investigated''
before Chinese courts accept their validity.104 Not until July 2004, did a Chinese court,
the Xiamen Intermediate People's Court, recognize and executed Taiwan's arbitral
decision.105
B. TAIWAN'S TRADE POLICY ON CHINA
From 1949, the ``three No's policy'', i.e., no contact, no negotiation and no
compromise, formed the basis of Taiwan's China policy. In 1987, the government
101 See Article 4, Taiwan Compatriot Investment Protection Law, available at <http://www.chinataiwan.org/
web/webportal/W5029558/A5037494.html> (``The State shall not nationalize or requisition the investment made
by investors who are Taiwan compatriots; under special circumstances and on the basis of the need of public
interests, the State may in accordance with legal procedures requisition the investments made by investors who are
Taiwan compatriots and make appropriate compensations thereto.''); Article 5, Wholly Foreign Owned Enterprise
Law, available at <http://www.qis.net/chinalaw/prclaw12.htm> (``The state shall not nationalize or requisition any
enterprise with foreign capital. Under special circumstances, when public interest requires, enterprises with foreign
capital may be requisitioned by legal procedures and appropriate compensation shall be made.'').
102 Id.
103 Article 6, Trade Management Regulation on the Taiwan Area (in Chinese), available at <http://
tw.people.com.cn/BIG5/14866/14928/866911.html>.
104 This regulation is set forth in Article 4 of the Regulations Governing Recognition by the People's Court
of Civil Judgments Rendered by the Taiwan Courts. Li Jui-wen, Mainland Courts Recognize Taiwan Arbitral Decision
for the First Time, 78 Exchange (December 2004), p. 59; See ibid., p. 59 (``Taiwan began recognizing and executing
mainland's civil conclusive judgments and civil arbitral decisions in 1992, when the [Act g]overning Relations
between the Peoples of the Taiwan and Mainland Areas was drafted.'').
105 See ibid. (stating that the case was decided by Taiwan's Chinese Arbitration Association and because assets
of the losing defendant are located in China, the plaintiff submitted the decision to the Chinese court).
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lifted the ban on Taiwanese residents visiting China and removed the Central Bank's
approval for outbound capital below US$ 5 million.106 As a result, indirect trade with
China was permitted for the first time. Around the same time, Taiwan's drastic
currency appreciation, along with the increasing costs of land and labour, greatly
undermined the competitiveness of Taiwan's manufacturing. Moreover, China's
preferential treatment to foreign investors, its similarities in language and culture, and
low labour cost made China an ideal location for Taiwan's labour-intensive and export-
oriented companies. For these reasons, Taiwanese enterprises shifted sharply to
China.107
Worrying that continuing economic links with China will ``hollow out'' Taiwan's
industries and increase China's political leverage, the Taiwan government launched the
``no haste, be patient'' policy in the 1990s. To diversify outbound capital and reduce
political risks, the policy aimed at capping investments in China and encouraging
investments in Southeast Asian countries.108 Political forum intensely debated the issue
of ``Go South'' or ``Go West'' in terms of the country's outbound investment.109
Empirical studies show that the policy failed to achieve its goals.110 After 1995, the
value of cross-strait trade grew at increasing speed and China, replacing the United
States, became Taiwan's most crucial export country.111 China's export products, many
of which were made by Taiwan invested factories, began becoming Taiwan's
manufacturers' competitors in the international market.112 China's Taiwan
companies also began localizing their purchase instead of importing raw materials
and semi-finished products from Taiwan.113 The WTO law will inevitably intensify
Taiwan's trade dependency on China, since trade barriers imposed by the Taiwan
government will need to be dismantled.
106 Barry Naughton (ed.), The China Circle: Economics and Electronic in the PRC, Taiwan, and Hong Kong
(Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1997), p. 102.
107 See, e.g., Klintworth, as note 71 above, p. 147 (``Most of Taiwan's cement makers have also gone
offshoreÐ`it was a matter of survival' . . . Formosa Plastics . . . was investing in the mainland because `intensified
competition made it necessary' . . . Taiwan's camera makers were forced to build factories in China to try to
maintain their competitive edge . . .'').
108 Lee J. Brenner, The Effect of China's WTO Accession on Taiwan, available at <www. Leejbrenner.com/
The_Effect_of_China's_WTO_.html> (last visited 29 July 2004) (discussing that Taiwan banned ``investment in
PRC infrastructure, high-technology industries, and the energy and service sectors, requiring investments over $5
million to be licensed and capping individual projects at $50 million'').
109 See Peng, as note 91 above, p. 644 (``In 1995, `Go West' or `Go South' became the controversial issues
during the pre-election presidential candidate debate held by the Democracy Progressive Party. Min-min Peng, the
`godfather' of Taiwan independence, objected to continued strengthening of economic ties with China for political
reasons.'').
110 See Table 6 Estimation of Trade between Taiwan and Mainland China, Mainland Affairs Council,
available at <www.mac.gov.tw/big5/statistic/em/145/6.pdf> (10 March 2005) (showing that cross-strait trade
increased from US$ 5.1 billion in 1990 to US$ 31.2 billion in 2000).
111 Wei-Bin Zhang, Taiwan's Modernization: Americanization and Modernizing Confucian Manifestations
(Singapore: World Scientific, 2003), p. 156.
112 Rong-I Wu, Taiwan's Future Economic Place in the World, available at <www.csis.org/asia/events/
020206wu.pdf> (6 February 2002) (``[T]he pattern of industrial relationship between the two economies has
gradually transformed from `vertical division of labor' to `horizontal competition' . . . In 2000, China's total IT
exports amounted to $37 billion, of which 72% was generated by the Taiwanese IT firms.'').
113 Wei-Wei Zhang, ``The Concept of `Greater China''', in Fu-Kuo Liu and Philippe Regnier (eds),
Regionalism in East Asia: Paradigm Shifting 166 (London: Routledge Curzon, 2003), p. 166.
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Common business interests with China gradually shape Taiwan's China policy.
Taiwan's new president Chen Shui-bian departed from the KMT's traditional policy of
opposing the PRC's participation in international settings. He called upon the United
States to grant China's Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR) in order to
expedite WTO accession for China and Taiwan.114 In addition, because a large number
of Taiwan export enterprises have relocated to China, the absence of preferential
market access to the US market for China will have a negative impact on Taiwan
companies' competitiveness, indirectly undermining Taiwan's economic growth. Since
2000, Taiwan replaced the ``no haste, be patient'' policy with the principle of
``proactive liberalization with effective management''.115
Taiwan's China policy is based on the Guidelines for National Reunification,
enacted by the Executive Yuan (Cabinet) in 1991. The Guidelines adopted a three-
phase approach toward reunification. Because cross-strait relations have not met the
conditions set forth in the second phrase, ``direct postal, transport and commercial
links'' are not permitted.116 Thus, to regulate cross-strait activities, the government in
1992 promulgated the Act Governing Relations between Peoples of the Taiwan Area
and the Mainland Area (Cross-Strait Act), which laid the foundation of all laws and
regulations pertaining to China.
C. WTO IMPLICATIONS
World Trade Organization rules require that both China and Taiwan establish
normal trade relations in compliance with their international obligations. On the China
side, the WTO's impact on the trade policy on Taiwan is relatively minimal. Some
called Taiwan enterprises' preferential treatment for investments and lower tariffs rate
``super-national-treatment''. Nonetheless, the WTO's most-favoured-nation principle
will mandate the gradual easing of such treatment or extend such privileges to other
WTO Members. In fact, China's continuing reduction of overall tariff rates and non-
tariff barriers has largely narrowed the competitiveness between foreign companies and
Taiwan companies.117 Presumably, China's policy to reduce economic privileges of
Taiwanese businesses also pressures the Taiwanese government to resume bilateral
negotiations on the premise of the ``one China'' principle should it intend to maintain
its nationals' preferential treatment on the mainland.
114 See Brenner, as note 108 above (``Although US policy does not link admission of Taiwan to a successful
application by China, most members of the WTO have accepted the idea that Taiwan will not gain entry until
China is admitted.'')
115 Taiwan Yearbook 2004, Taiwan-China Relations, available at <http://www.gio.gov.tw.taiwan-website/5-
gp/yearbook/P087.htm> (last visited 18 March 2005).
116 The second phrase conditions in the Guidelines include both sides' ``official communication channels on
equal footing'', ``taking part in international organizations and activities'', and ``[m]utual visits by high-ranking
officials''. Guidelines for National Unification, 14 March 1991, available at <http://www.president.gov.tw/
2_special/unification>.
117 Peng, as note 91 above, pp. 641±642.
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Compared to China, Taiwan's WTO membership will have a greater impact on its
discriminatory measures against China. In my view, Taiwan will need to revise
incompatible laws in compliance with WTO law unless invoking safeguard measures or
other WTO exceptions.118 Below I consider Taiwan's current laws that conflict with
WTO requirements.
1. Trade in Goods
The golden rule of the Cross-Strait Act is Article 35, which provides that engaging
in trade with China is subject to the government's approval.119 Pursuant to this
provision, the government further requires that all goods involved in cross-strait trade
``shall be transshipped via third territories or the off-shore shipping center''.120 In other
words, direct importation or exportation of goods between China and Taiwan is
prohibited. Taiwan's discriminatory laws against such goods are contrary to Article I of
the GATT, which stipulates that ``all rules and formalities in connection with
importation and exportation'' should comply with the MFN principle.121
Taiwan's discrimination against imports from China is because of its fear that rapid
inflow of Chinese goods may turn Taiwan's trade surplus to trade deficit. Beginning in
1988, Taiwan began gradually permitting goods produced in China, from raw materials
to finished products, to enter Taiwan.122 Considering Chinese agricultural products'
low cost and the potential impact on domestic agriculture, the government adopted the
``positive list'' for the import of agricultural goods from China.123 Only listed
agricultural items were allowed to enter the domestic market. In addition, the
government adopted the ``positive list'' to govern the import of industrial goods
because such goods could enhance the competitiveness of Taiwan's export products.
These measures were replaced in April 1998 by the ``ROC Classification List for
Import and Export Goods'' and the ``List of Mainland Permitted Items''.124 Based on
the principles of ``national security'' and the ``serious negative impact on related
domestic industries'',125 Taiwan's Bureau of Foreign Trade has periodically reviewed
the lists. In reality, controversies regarding import permissions frequently occurred
because the Bureau set no clear standards on ``serious negative impact''.
118 See, e.g., GATT Article XXI (``Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed . . . to prevent any
contracting party from taking any action which it considers necessary for the protection of its essential security
interests . . .'').
119 See Article 35, Cross-Strait Act (``Any individual, juristic person, organization, or other institution of the
Taiwan Area may be permitted by the competent authorities to engage in the trade between the Taiwan Area and
the Mainland Area . . .'').
120 Article 5, Regulations Governing Permissions of Trade Between Taiwan Area and Mainland Area,
available at <www.mac.gov.tw/english/english/law/en09.pdf> (hereinafter Cross-Strait Trade Regulations).
121 GATT Article I.
122 Introduction to Management of the Import of Mainland Products (in Chinese), Ministry of Economic Affairs, 8
March 2003, available at <ekm92.trade.gov.tw/BOFT/OpenFileService2>.
123 Id.
124 Id.
125 Article 8, Cross-Strait Trade Regulations.
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The government, as of March 2005, has permitted 2,359 argricutural products and
8,643 industrial items produced in China.126 However, contrary to the MFN principle,
Taiwan excludes numerous categories of Chinese goods, but allows the import of like
products from other countries. Although this practice is presumably contrary to Article
XI of the GATT requiring elimination of quantitative restrictions,127 China will
unlikely take any action against Taiwan under the WTO because doing so will confer de
facto equal status on Taiwan.
2. Trade in Services
While commercial services currently account for 20 percent of total trade, they
represent 60 percent of employment and production128 and amount to more than
US$ 1.4 trillion.129 The Uruguay Round first brought services under multinational
disciplines in the General Agreements on Trade in Services (GATS), which came into
effect in January 1995. Similar to the GATT, the GATS also upholds principles, such as
MFN and national treatment. Article II sets forth the MFN principle for market access,
requiring that all WTO Members grant equal treatment to all ``services and services
suppliers'' from other Members.130 Nonetheless, distinguishing from the GATT, the
MFN principle of the GATS permits ``exemptions'',131 which must be listed by a
Member on its MFN Exemptions List should it decide not to grant similar privileges to
certain Members. Furthermore, each Member must submit a Schedule of Specific
Commitments that lists services sectors ``for which the Member guarantees market
access and national treatment and any limitations that may be attached''.132
Given the foregoing operations of the GATS, what is crucial to a Member's
obligations are the attached MFN Exemptions List and the Schedule of Specific
Commitments, rather than the Agreement itself. As Taiwan did not exclude China
from its MFN Exemptions List, the country is required to accord equal services
treatment to China according to its Schedule of Specific Commitments. Three major
aspects should be noted.
126 The List of Mainland's Permitted Agricultural and Industrial Goods (in Chinese), Ministry of Economic Affairs,
8 March 2003, available at <ekm92.trade.gov.tw/BOFT/OpenFileService2>.
127 See GATT Article XI (``No Prohibition or restrictions . . . whether made effective through quotas,
import or export licenses or other measures, shall be instituted or maintained . . .'').
128 The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS): Objectives, Coverage and Disciplines, at <http://
www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/gatsqa_e.htm> (last visited 20 March 2005).
129 Jackson, as note 2 above, p. 853.
130 See General Agreement on Trade in Services, 15 April 1994, Article II, sec. 1, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the WTO, Annex 1B, Legal InstrumentsÐResults of the Uruguay Round, vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 142
(1994) (hereinafter GATS) (``[E]ach member shall accord immediately and unconditionally to services and service
suppliers of any other Member treatment no less favorable than that it accords to like services and service suppliers
of any other country.'').
131 GATT Article II, sec. 2. See also GATS, as note 8 above (``All exemptions are subject to review; they
should in principle not last longer than 10 years.'').
132 GATS, as note 128 above. Each Member is required to list four modes of supply in the Schedule: 1)
Cross-border supply, 2) Consumption abroad, 3) Commercial presence, 4) Presence of natural persons.
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First, legal questions may arise pertaining to services-related investments. Taiwan
guaranteed that subject to some ceiling limitations as to the percentage of foreign capital
in certain industries,133 ``foreign business and persons may directly invest'' in
Taiwan.134 Yet, contrary to the MFN, Taiwan requires that investments from
Chinese counterparts and even companies with Chinese capital in any third area be
prohibited unless permitted by the government.135 Like the MFN principle of GATT
Article I, which governs ``rules or formalities'' relating to ``importation and
exportation'',136 the MFN principle of GATS Article II governs trade measures
related to ``services and services suppliers''.137 Consequently, Taiwan's restrictions on
Taiwanese companies' investments in China may constitute a violation under the
GATS. In order to gradually conform to the GATS, Taiwan recently rescinded the
regulations, restricting maximum investments in China to US$ 50 million and to
40 percent of Taiwan companies' capital.138
Second, the Cross-Strait Act's provisions provide that unless permitted, no
``vessels, aircraft or other means of transportation'' can ``sail or fly'' between China and
Taiwan.139 Some aspects of these provisions are incompatible with the MFN principle
in Article II of the GATS. Currently, Taiwan does not permit regular direct air flights
between China and Taiwan, although ad hoc indirect chartered flights for the lunar new
year were operated twice in 2003 and 2005 respectively. Therefore, most travellers
flying to Taiwan or China have to transfer through Hong Kong or Macau, unavoidably
increasing their travel time. However, Taiwan's restrictions on cross-strait air tansport
services are unlikely to be challenged, since the GATS does not apply to measures as to
``traffic rights'' or ``services directly related to the exercise of traffic rights''.140
Taiwan's restrictions on sea transport services are problematic. Currently, Taiwan
prohibits direct cross-strait sea transport, with the exception of the ``mini-three-links''
which permit direct transportation between Chinese ports and Taiwan's offshore
islands of Kinmen and Matsu. Since the GATS is concerned with equal treatment as to
133 See Report of the Working Party on the Accession of the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and
Matsu, 5 October 2001, available at <http://docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments/t/WT/ACC/TPKM18A2.doc>
(hereinafter TPKM Report) (``Foreign business and individuals may directly invest in Chinese Taipei, unless
otherwise falling into the measures of limitations specified in the specific sectors'').
134 See, e.g., ibid. (``Direct investment by non-Chinese Taipei persons in a service supplier cannot exceed
20%, but the aggregate of direct and indirect investment by non-Chinese'').
135 See Article 73, Cross-Strait Act (``Unless permitted by the competent authorities, any individual, juristic
person, organization, or other institution of the Mainland Area, or any company it invests in any third area may not
engage in any investment activity in the Taiwan Area.''). Taiwan's Executive Yuan cancelled the 20 percent ceiling
restriction in the 1993 revision.
136 GATT Article I, sec. 1.
137 GATS Article II, sec. 1.
138 Tsering Namgyal, ``Dangerous Liaisons'' Post-WTO Taiwan-China Economic Ties, European Chamber of
Commerce in Taipei, available at <www.ecct.com.tw/euroview/issue79/wto.php> (last visited 29 July 2004).
139 See, e.g., Article 29, Cross-Strait Act (``Unless permitted by the competent authorities, no Mainland
vessels, civil aircraft or other means of transportation may enter into the restricted or prohibited waters of the
Taiwan Area or the controlled airspace of the Taipei Flight Information Region.'') These provisions apply to both
foreign companies and companies from China or Taiwan.
140 GATS Annex on Air Transport Services. Yet, the GATS apply to (a) aircraft repair and maintenance
services; (b) the selling and marketing of air transport services; (c) computer reservation system (CRS) services.
Ibid.
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trade measures governing services and service suppliers, it applies to Taiwan's measures
barring companies from operating sea transport services from Taiwan to China. As to
services from China to Taiwan, Taiwan made a general reservation in its Schedule of
Specific Commitments.141 Since 1997, Taiwan permitted cross-strait sea transport
services between Chinese ports and Taiwan's offshore transshipment centres.142
Nonetheless, Taiwan only allowed foreign ships and ships under flags of convenience
operated by companies from Taiwan and China. In other words, Taiwan's restrictions
violate the MFN principle of Article II of the GATS by excluding vessels of Chinese
nationality.
Finally, in its Schedule of Specific Commitments, Taiwan committed to
permitting foreign business visitors to stay in the country up to 90 days and foreign
intra-corporate transferees to stay up to three years.143 Yet, the government imposed
more burdensome procedural requirements for Chinese business visitors. For instance,
their companies in Taiwan must apply for entry permissions on their behalf and the
scope of companies is also limited.144 In addition, these immigration restrictions serve
as barriers deliberately preventing Chinese professionals, such as accountants and
lawyers, from entering the Taiwan market. Consequently, these restrictions are
repugnant to the MFN principle of the GATS and need to be further relaxed.
3. Trade-Related Investment Measures
Recognizing certain investment measures may lead to a negative impact on free
trade, GATT contracting parties in the Uruguay Round concluded the Agreement on
Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs). It is worth mentioning that the TRIMs
Agreement only applies to measures affecting trade in goods and not to those affecting
trade in services. Thus, the Agreement is not concerned with Taiwan's restrictions on
its companies' investments in China and Chinese companies' investments in Taiwan.
The purpose of the Agreement is to prohibit trade-related measures inconsistent
with Article III (national treatment) and Article XI (quantitative restrictions) of the
141 See TPKM Report, as note 133 above (``Import and export of freight that has an origin of Chinese Taipei
(7123**, excluding regular route freight transportation as currently defined in the Highway Law and those services
currently specifically reserved to the Chinese Taipei's postal authorities by law)'').
142 Tsai Horng-ming, Cast Aside Political Obstacles: Open up Direct Link Talks, 76 Exchange (August 2004), p.
22 (``The vessels that come under [Taiwan's] offshore transshipment center's `Offshore transshipment center
establishment and work rules', are mainly foreign vessels operated by foreign companies, or companies from
Taiwan or mainland China. Mainland China's `Rules for the Management of Cross-Strait Shipping' for their part
. . . [exclude foreign ships, but permit] ships under flag of convenience [operated by companies of Taiwan or China]
. . .'').
143 TPKM Report, as note 133 above.
144 Permission Regulation on Mainland Chinese Entering Taiwan to Engage in Commercial Activities (in Chinese),
available at <www.mac.gov.tw/gb/gb/law/economy/103161.htm> (last visited 20 March 2005). See also Article 10,
Cross-Strait Act (``No people of the Mainland Area may enter into the Taiwan Area without permission of the
competent authorities.'').
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GATT.145 As the Illustrative List of the Agreement shows, these measures may be
domestic content requirements or limitations on investors' ability to import or export.
As I find Taiwan's restrictions on the import of Chinese goods contrary to Article XI of
the GATT in the previous section of Trade in Goods, these measures would be also
incompatible with the TRIMs Agreement and need to be gradually eased.
V. DISPUTE RESOLUTION OF CROSS-STRAIT TRADE MATTERS
A fundamental question that arises in cross-strait relations is whether the WTO
dispute resolution mechanism can solve bilateral trade conflicts. Despite the political
hostility of their respective governments, trade activities between China and Taiwan
increased rapidly. Nonetheless, no bilateral negotiations or the dispute resolution
mechanisms exist between the two states. Both Taiwan and China established
``unofficial'' organizations under the aegis of government bodies to deal with each
other. Representatives from Taiwan's Strait Exchange Foundation (SEF) and China's
Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARTS) held their first bilateral
meeting in Singapore and concluded four agreements.146 Nonetheless, China
suspended bilateral talks in protest of former President Lee's ``two-state theory''.
A. POSSIBILITY OF USE OF THE WTO DISPUTE RESOLUTION MECHANISM
The purpose of the DSU is to preserve WTO Members' rights and obligations.
After Taiwan and China joined the WTO, the WTO dispute resolution mechanism
became equally available to both sides. Will China sue Taiwan for violating WTO rules
by imposing discriminatory trade barriers against China? The answer may be ``no''. The
PRC has considered cross-straits trade disputes as ``internal affairs'' and has been
reluctant to negotiate with Taiwan and resolve cross-strait trade issues under the
WTO.147 China sees Taiwan's every move in the WTO as a means to prove its
``statehood'' and as a step toward independence. Thus, Lung Yongtu, the PRC's top
trade negotiator, emphasized that China would not hold consultations with Taiwan
145 Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, 15 April 1994, Article 2, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the WTO, Annex 1A, The Legal TextsÐResults of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations, 143 (1999), 33 I.L.M. 1153 (1994) (hereinafter TRIMs).
146 Zhang, as note 111 above, p. 155 (discussing the ARATS±SEF meeting); Wei-Wei Zhang, The Concept
of `Greater China' in Regionalism in East Asia: Paradigm Shifting 166 (Fu-Kuo Liu & Philippe Regnier ed. 2003)
(same). Government agencies responsible for cross-strait issues are the Mainland Affairs Council (Taiwan) and the
Taiwan Affairs Council (China). Both of them are at the ministerial level in two states.
147 See, e.g., Qingjiang Kong, Can the WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism Resolve Trade Disputes Between
China and Taiwan?, 5 J. Int'l Econ. L. 3 (2002), pp. 747, 755 (discussing the statements of Tang Shubei, former
Executive vice-president of the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait, and Zhang Minqing,
spokesman for the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council, that the PRC opposes any attempt to discuss cross-
strait economic and trade affairs under the WTO and does not intend to resort to the dispute resolution mechanism
to resolve such matters).
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unless the ``one China'' issue was solved.148 Yet, as both Taiwan and China are full
WTO Members, China's refusal to hold consultations with Taiwan would be contrary
to Article 4 of the DSU. Taiwan would be entitled to further request the establishment
the panel under Article 6 of the DSU. Although China fears that a case arising between
China and Taiwan may create the impression of ``two countries'', China cannot deny
the WTO dispute resolution mechanism's compulsory jurisdiction.149
On the Taiwan side, the government is motivated to include cross-strait trade
issues into the WTO framework. First, it would be a great opportunity to show that
the ROC and the PRC are on an equal status. The PRC in its propaganda often
asserts that Taiwan joined the WTO as ``China's'' separate customs territory and
Taiwan's status is indistinguishable from Hong Kong and Macau.150 Furthermore, the
``one country, four seats'' arrangement consistent with the one China principle is
what the WTO specially designed for China. While it is true that Taiwan did not
accede to the WTO as a ``state'' member, Taiwan's accession history unambiguously
proves that Taiwan is not part of the PRC. Thus, Taiwan's suit against China may
buttress its political claim.
Second, as of 2003, China has signed 105 bilateral investment protection
agreements with foreign countries.151 In the absence of an agreement with China,
Taiwanese investors lack international protection for their investments. Therefore,
Taiwan would likely use the WTO system to protect its business interests in China.
Third, due to the suspension of cross-strait dialogues, the WTO may provide a new
forum for both sides to negotiate. Commentators suggested that Taipei, Washington,
D.C., and Beijing formed a triangle in the political arena. In my opinion, a new triangle
in the trade circle is emerging among Taipei, Geneva, and Beijing.
B. CASES EXAMINATION: CROSS-STRAIT TRADE CONFLICTS
China might find it difficult to oppose interactions with Taiwan in the WTO.
According to Article 18 of the Protocol on the Accession of the PRC, the WTO's
subsidiary bodies should review China's implementation of its commitments
annually.152 This process is called the Transitional Review Mechanism and will last
ten years.153 At the first review session in 2002, every country having substantial trade
148 Taiwan Calls for M'land China to Respect WTO Rules, Central News Agency (Taiwan), 3 September 2002,
available at Lexis, News Library, Allasi File.
149 See John Shijian Mo, Settlement of Trade Dispute between Mainland China and the Separate Customs Territory of
Taiwan within the WTO, 2 Chinese J. Int'l L. 1 (2003), pp. 145, 167 (``In fact, the `One China' principle cannot
deny the DSB's jurisdiction.'').
150 Cf. ibid., p. 168 (``Being equal members with Mainland China in the WTO does not change the fact that
Taiwan is part of China. This is the same relationships between China and Hong Kong or Macau . . .'').
151 China Hopes to Sign More Investment Protection Agreement with More Portuguese Countries, People's Daily, 13
October 2003, available at <http://english.people.com.cn/200310/13/eng20031013_125858.shtml>.
152 Article 18, Protocol on the Accession of the People's Republic of China, available at <http://
law.people.com.cn/doc/26.doc>.
153 Id.
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with China had questioned China regarding wide-ranging aspects.154 Taiwan's mission
also submitted ten written inquiries. Nonetheless, Chinese delegates either
ambiguously answered Taiwan's questions or expressed that both sides should
negotiate through bilateral channels. This very first interaction again showed China's
reluctance to face Taiwan in the WTO.
In March 2002, China first launched an anti-dumping investigation on the cold-
rolled steel sheet imported from Taiwan, along with Russia, Korea, and Kazakhstan.155
This was the first cross-strait trade conflict after the WTO accession of Taiwan and
China. Within a week, China started another anti-dumping investigation on polyvinyl
chloride (PVC) imported from Taiwan, as well as the United States, Korea and
Russia.156 For both cases, China's Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic
Cooperation (MOFTEC) notified all governments of interested parties except
Taiwan. Instead, China's steel and plastics industries informed their Taiwanese
counterparts of these anti-dumping investigations. In my view, China's attempts to
bypass the Taiwan government violated not only WTO law but also domestic law.
According to Article 6 of the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the
GATT 1994 (Anti-dumping Agreement), interested parties, including ``the
government of the exporting Member'', should be ``given notice of the information''
in an anti-dumping investigation.157 Furthermore, China's legal basis for anti-dumping
investigations was the Anti-dumping Statute. Article 16 of the statute requires the
MOFTEC to notify ``the relevant governments of exporting countries (areas)'' of its
anti-dumping investigations.158 The PRC violated these requirements guaranteeing the
procedural due process by failing to notify the Taiwan government.
It is also interesting to note that China's anti-dumping investigation targeting
Taiwan may be presumably in conflict with its ``one China'' principle. The enactment
of the Anti-dumping Statute was based on the Foreign Trade Law. However, Article 43
of the Foreign Trade Law provides that the law ``shall not apply to the separate customs
territories of the People's Republic of China''.159 If China deems Taiwan its separate
customs territory, why apply the Anti-dumping Statute to cross-strait trade matters?
In May 2002, China adopted provisional safeguard measures against imports of 48
steel products from Taiwan and took formal safeguard measures against five of the
products.160 Again, instead of notifying the Taiwan government of such measures,
154 Annual Review, as note 87 above.
155 China Sets off Anti-dumping Investigation on Steel Products from Russia & ROK, People's Daily, 27 March
2002, available at <http://english.people.com.cn/200203/27/eng20020327_92931.shtml>.
156 Ministry of Commerce Notice No. 11, Xinhua News Agency, 13 May 2003, available at <http://
news.xinhuanet.com/english/2003-05/13/content_1058245.htm>.
157 Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, 15
April 1994, Article 6, WTO Agreement, Annex 1A, Legal InstrumentsÐResults of the Uruguay Round, vol. 1,
33 I.L.M. 1133 (1994).
158 Anti-dumping Statute (in Chinese), available at <http://www.people.com.cn/GB/paper464/4928/
530400.html>.
159 Article 43, Foreign Trade Law, available at <http://www.chinatoday.com/law/a07.htm>.
160 Annual Review, as note 87 above.
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China only informed the Taiwan Iron and Steel Industries Association.161 Failure to
inform the Taiwan government placed China in violation of the Safeguard Agreement.
While it is legal for a WTO Member to ``take a provisional safeguard measure'',162 the
Member is required, according to Article 12 of the Safeguard Agreement, to notify
``those Members having a substantial interest as exporters of the product concerned''.163
In other words, China was obligated to notify the Taiwan government of the
implementation of safeguard measures.
Upon Taiwan's request to hold consultations on this matter, the PRC's WTO
mission replied to Taiwan's Mission. However, in its correspondence China referred to
Taiwan as an economic and trade office, not by its official title as the permanent
mission. Taiwan promptly informed its Chinese counterpart that it had neither the
obligation nor intention to sit down for talks until requested to do so in the appropriate
manner.164 As the PRC overcame its reluctance, news of the first official dialogue
between Taiwan and China grabbed the attention of other WTO Members. The
much-anticipated meeting was held on 12 December 2002.165 Despite its failure to
arrive at a substantive conclusion, the meeting opened a gate for future interactions.
VI. CONCLUSION
As a non-recognized state, Taiwan's accession into the WTO is a major diplomatic
and economic breakthrough; this is especially true since it was ousted from the United
Nations and its affiliated organizations in the 1970s. The PRC, based on its ``one
China'' principle, had consistently opposed Taiwan's application for its GATT and
WTO memberships. The Article found the PRC's claim that accession procedures
applying to Taiwan and Hong Kong should be identical erroneous because, under
international trade law, the ROC is the automatic government acting ``on behalf of''
Taiwan and thus does not need the PRC's ``sponsorship''. Taiwan's successful entry
into the WTO indicates the validity of this position, although its membership as a
``separate customs territory'', rather than as a ``state'', reflects that it had to accede to a
political compromise, albeit reluctantly.
Coexistence of China and Taiwan makes the WTO a new diplomatic battle.
China continuously downgrades Taiwan's status to avoid the impression of ``two
countries'', whereas Taiwan attempts to ``internationalize'', or ``politicize'' the cross-
strait trade issues to prove its autonomy and separate itself from China. Having
examined the domestic trade laws and policies of China and Taiwan, this Article
suggested that Taiwan's current trade barriers against China, such as the indirect ``three
161 Id.
162 Agreement on Safeguards, 15 April 1994, Article 5, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex 1A, 1869 U.N.T.S. 154 (1994).
163 Ibid., Article 12.
164 Eyton, as note 64 above.
165 Annual Review, as note 87 above.
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links'', may constitute violations of numerous trade agreements and need to be revised.
In addition, China's ``one China'' principle, which deems cross-strait trade conflicts as
domestic affairs, is unlikely to trump the compulsory jurisdiction of the WTO Dispute
Resolution Mechanism.
In conclusion, under the WTO framework, both China and Taiwan should abide
by WTO law and treat the other as an equal trade partner. The WTO provides
opportunity for facilitating cross-strait dialogues, and increasingly intensified economic
relations may lead to political integration. At the same time, the WTO also brings
challenge to both states since immense trade flows from the other side may be
detrimental to domestic industries, and resorting to the WTO Dispute Resolution
Mechanism may worsen bilateral political ties. Both China±Taiwan relations and the
WTO's development are changing rapidly. The only predicable thing is
unpredictability.
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